The paper provides a reformulation of Nash equilibrium based on optimization approach. The set of Nash equilibria, if it is nonempty, is identical to the set of optimizers of a real-valued function, which connects the equilibrium problem to the optimization problem. Using this characterization, we study the interchangeability of Nash equilibria, and show that existing results on two-person (i) zero-sum games and (ii) supermodular games can be derived, in a unified fashion, by the lattice structure on optimal solutions. JEL classification: C61, C72.
Introduction
Since the seminal papers by Nash (1950a Nash ( , 1951 , Nash equilibrium has been the central notion of non-cooperative game theory. There is vast literature in game theory that studies properties and structures of Nash equilibrium, for example, existence, uniqueness, continuity, stability, robustness, comparative statics, and so on.
This note first reviews, in Section 2, three standard formulations of Nash equilibria. They entail (1) inequality constraints, (2) optimal solutions to a multivariate function, and (3) fixed points of the best reply correspondence, respectively. Then, in Section 3, we derive another formulation by introducing a real-valued function that can completely characterize Nash equilibria.
1 Precisely, the set of Nash equilibria, if it is nonempty, is shown to be identical to the set of optimizers of a real-valued function. The result essentially connects the equilibrium problem to the optimization problem. In contrast to the standard formulations of Nash equilibria in Section 2, this optimization approach, for example, can be directly applied to comparative statics with respect to Nash equilibria, not to best replies. As an application, Section 4 studies the interchangeability of Nash equilibria in two person games. A pair of Nash equilibia of a two-person game, x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ), is called interchangeable if (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x 1 , x 2 ) also constitute Nash equilibia of the same game. It is widely known in the literature that (i) for a two-person zero-sum game any pairs of its mixed strategy Nash equilibria are interchangeable (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) . establishes the similar result for two-person supermodular games. Namely, he shows that (ii) any unordered pairs of the pure strategy Nash equilibria are interchangeable for a two-person supermodular game, provided that each player's strategy space is totally ordered.
2 While it is not directly related to interchangeability, Vives (1985) discovers that (iii) the equilibrium set of a two-person strictly supermodular game with totally ordered strategy spaces, is totally ordered. We show that the existing results (i), (ii) and (iii) can be derived, in a unified fashion, by the lattice structure on optimal solutions: the set of minimizers of submodular function becomes sublattice (Topkis, 1978) . Section 5 concludes the paper.
Existing Formulations: Equilibrium Approach
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of players. A strategy of each player i is denoted by x i ∈ X i , and X is the Cartesian product of strategy spaces, i.e., X = X 1 × · · · × X n . Depending on the focus of analysis, one can regard X i as a set of pure strategies or that of mixed strategies. A payoff function of each player i is denoted by u i : X → R. There are at least three (equivalent) ways to mathematically define Nash equilibrium. The first and the most standard approach entails inequality constraints for each player. Namely, a strategy profile x * = (x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * n ) ∈ X is called Nash equilibrium if and only if,
Assume that the maximum level of utility (given other players' strategies) is well-defined. Then, the definition (1) is identical to
Since x * maximizes utility functions for all players simultaneously (provided that strategies of other players x −i is fixed to x * −i ), x * can be regarded as a maximum solution to multivariate function u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) : X → R n . This is the second approach.
Finally, let BR i : X −i ⇒ X i be player i's best reply,
Denote the best reply correspondence as BR = (BR 1 , . . . , BR n ) : X ⇒ X, the Cartesian product of every player i's best reply. Now, a Nash equilibrium x * can also be characterized by the fixed point of this best reply correspondence,
The above three approaches, (1) to (3), are representative ways to formulate Nash equilibrium in the literature. In what follows, we provide a related but different characterization that makes use of a functional, not a (multivariate) function.
Another Formulation: Optimization Approach
Let us define f : X → R, which aggregates maximum deviation gains (from a fixed action profile x) across players,
Then, Nash equilibrium is completely characterized by f .
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Theorem 1 A strategy profile x * is a Nash equilibrium if and only if f (x * ) = 0.
Note that this is equivalent to (2), the second definition of Nash equilibrium.
Our formulation is closely related to that proposed by Nikaido and Isoda (1955) . They define Φ : X 2 → R such that Φ(x, y) = i∈N u i (x i , y −i ) and show that x * is a Nash equilibrium if and only if Φ(x, x * ) attains its maximum at x = x * . 5 Using this Φ and br, an arbitrary selection of best reply correspondence, i.e., br(x) ∈ BR(x) for all x ∈ X, our f can be expressed by
. 4 We assume an environment that guarantees the existence of the maximum payoff, so that (4) is well-defined. Such environments include finite strategy spaces, compact strategy spaces with continuous payoff functions, and so on. Note that if maximum does not exist, standard formulations (2) and (3) are no longer well-defined. 5 Their equation (4) on page 810 is essentially identical to our (4) except that their mapping is defined on X 2 , not on X. See Aubin (1998) for related methods and extensive literature. Similar characterizations are proposed, mainly in operations research, to analyze the generalized Nash equilibrium, an extended solution concept of Nash equilibrium. See, for example, Facchinei and Kanzow (2010) and Pang and Fukushima (2005) . Myerson (1997) characterizes correlated equilibria by the strategic incentive problem, a class of linear programming problems, which also builds on the similar optimization idea.
The next theorem illustrates that the set of Nash equilibria, if it is nonempty, can be characterized by the set of (global) minimizers of f . Theorem 2 Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium. Then, the set of Nash equilibria is identical to the set of minimum solutions to f , arg min x∈X f (x).
Proof. By construction, f (x) ≥ 0 holds for any x ∈ X. Since f (x * ) = 0 by Theorem 1, f must attain its minimum at (any) Nash equilibrium x * . Theorem 1 also implies that f (x) > 0 must hold for any non-equilibrium profile x(∈ X) = x * , which completes the proof.
Minimizing a function f (·) is equivalent to maximizing −f (·). Therefore, Nash equilibria are also characterized by maximizers of an optimization problem.
The set of Nash equilibria, if it is nonempty, is identical to the set of maximum solutions to g, arg max x∈X g(x).
Using Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, one can always translate Nash equilibria into solutions to the associated (unconstrained) optimization problem. Note that our approach is potentially applicable to cooperative game solutions in the following sense. If some solution concept in cooperative game is Nash implementable, i.e., a set of cooperative solutions always coincides with a set of Nash equilibrium outcomes in a corresponding non-cooperative game, we can characterize the cooperative solution through (Nash equilibrium of) the non-cooperative game. Since rich mathematical properties are known for optimal solutions, e.g., convexity, continuity, monotonicity and so on depending on environments, our finding may further enrich the understanding of the structure of Nash equilibria.
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Let t be a parameter of the game contained in a parameter set T . Then, (4) can be rewritten to explicitly incorporate this parameterization.
The Nash equilibria given parameter t are just minimum solutions as arg min x∈X f (x, t) or maximum solutions as arg max x∈X g(x, t) where g(x, t) = −f (x, t). This reformulation could be useful, for example, to analyze the continuity of Nash equilibria, that is, to examine how the set of Nash equilibria changes when the payoff functions change continuously with some parameter. It is widely known that the Nash correspondence, a mapping from parameter to Nash equilibria, is upper-hemi continuous under weak assumptions. 7 Indeed, upper-hemi continuity of best replies is a direct implication of the theorem of the maximum by Berge (1963) . Our characterization (5) expands the applicability of the theorem, and enables us to apply the theorem of the maximum directly to Nash equilibria, not just to best replies.
If our focus is on pure strategy Nash equilibria, we can arbitrary take strictly increasing transformation on each player's payoff function, since (pure strategy) best replies are preserved by any such transformation.
7 See, for example, Chapter 1.3.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 8 Since addition preserves continuity, f is continuous whenever u i and max u i are continuous for all i in N .
Another possible application is (monotone) comparative statics. 9 Making use of (5),
we can directly consider conditions under which the set of Nash equilibria, or an appropriate selection from them, is increasing/decreasing in the parameter t ∈ T . This is a sharp contrast to the existing studies such as Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , which examine best reply for each player instead of Nash equilibrium. Note that our formulation can also incorporate best reply, since it is just a (degenerated) Nash equilibrium when there is only one strategic player. To be precise, let us define f i (x, t) for i ∈ N as follows.
where x −i is fixed and hence considered as a parameter of the model. Since max
is just a constant (given x −i and t), solving arg min
. In this sense, comparative statics analysis on best replies can be regarded as a special case of (5) above. That is, in principle, we can reproduce all the results in the literature using our reformulation.
In the rest of this section, we provide a few extensions of the above theorems. While the key equation (4) has an intuitive interpretation, i.e., the sum of maximum deviation gains, it is not necessary to measure cardinal payoff differences, since the best replies (and hence Nash equilibria) depends only on ordinal payoff rankings. As we show below, a wide range of transformation (of payoff differences) is possible.
For each i ∈ N , consider a function ψ i : R + → R + such that ψ i (0) = 0, and definẽ f : X → R, using {ψ i } i∈N as follows. Note thatf (x) ≥ 0 holds for any x ∈ X, since the output of ψ i is assumed to be nonnegative for all i ∈ N .
Let Z i be a set of nonnegative real numbers such that ψ i takes 0,
Then, the next theorem provides the condition on ψ i under whichf (·) characterizes Nash equilibria, that is, to what extent we can transform each player's payoff difference.
Theorem 3 Fix {ψ i } i∈N in (6). Then, the following holds.
(i) For any game, every Nash equilibrium x * must satisfyf (x * ) = 0.
(ii) Strategy profile x that satisfiesf (x) = 0 must be a Nash equilibrium for any game, if and only if Z i = {0} for all i ∈ N .
(iii) Suppose Z i = {0} for all i ∈ N . Then, the set of Nash equilibria, if it is nonempty, is identical to the set of minimum solutions tof , arg min x∈Xf (x).
Proof. (i), (iii) and "if" part of (ii) are obvious and hence skipped. To prove "only if" part of (ii), suppose there exists a strictly positive number z i (> 0) ∈ Z i for some i, i.e., ψ i (z i ) = 0. Then, it suffices to show that we can always construct a game such that non-equilibrium profile x satisfiesf (x ) = 0. Consider the following simple game in which all players except for i have only one strategy each, X j = {x j } for all j = i, and player i has (at least) two strategies, denoted by x * i and x i . Note that this is essentially a single person game, and hence a Nash equilibrium corresponds to an optimal decision by player i. Assume that x * i is an optimal strategy for i, i.e., a best reply to other players' (unique) strategy profile x −i , while x i is not.
Thus, a strategy profile x = (x i , x −i ) is not a Nash equilibrium, but satisfiesf (x ) = 0.
A sufficient condition for (ii) is that ψ i is a strictly increasing function. Note also that Theorems 1 and 2 are special cases of Theorem 3 with ψ i being the identity function for all i, i.e., ψ i (x) = x for any x ∈ R + . Now consider an application of Theorem 3 such that ψ i is equal to an indicator function χ i : R + → {0, 1}, defined as follows.
Verify that χ i satisfies the requirement of ψ i above. Then,f (x) simply counts the number of players who have deviation incentives from x. Clearly, this becomes 0 if and only if no one has an incentive to deviate from the profile x; x is a Nash equilibrium. Such illustration might be helpful to understand the connection between our formulation and the standard definition of Nash equilibrium (especially (1) in Section 2).
In the above reformulations, Nash equilibria are characterized by solutions to the optimization problem whose objective function is the sum of deviation gains (Theorems 1 and 2) or its slight variant (Theorem 3). Theorem 4 below shows that the parallel characterization is available if the objective function is replaced with the product of deviation gains.
Let f be defined as follows.
f (x) = Π i∈N 1 + max
Note by construction that f (x) ≥ 1 holds for any x ∈ X. Then, we obtain the following.
Theorem 4 A strategy profile x * is a Nash equilibrium if and only if f (x * ) = 1. If there exists a Nash equilibrium, the set of Nash equilibria is identical to the set of minimum solutions to f , arg min x∈X f (x).
Proof. The direct proof is almost the same as in Theorems 1 and 2, and thereby skipped. Alternatively, we show an indirect proof that makes use of Theorem 3. Take ψ i (z) = ln(z + 1) for all z ∈ R + for all i ∈ N . Then,f (x) can be written as
Since the minimizers of ln f (x) coincides with f (x), we can apply Theorem 3.
We can replace 1 on the right hand side of (7) with other number ε. Then, x * becomes a Nash equilibrium if and only if f (x * ) = ε n . While we can take arbitrary small number, ε must be strictly positive. 10 As ε goes to 0, (7) converges to the product of players' payoff differences, which may look similar to the Nash product derived by Nash (1950b) to characterize his bargaining solution. In this (very weak) sense, our reformulation may suggest a connection between Nash equilibrium and Nash bargaining solution, albeit some apparent differences. For example, on Nash bargaining solution, the product is maximized while ours is minimized. On payoff difference for each player, a smaller payoff (when agreement is not reached) is fixed for the Nash product while a larger one (when best reply is taken) is fixed for f in our formulation.
Interchangeability for Two-Person Games
In this section, we study the interchangeability of Nash equilibria in two person games, as an application of our formulation of Nash equilibria in Section 3. A pair of Nash equilibia x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ) is called interchangeable if (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x 1 , x 2 ) constitute Nash equilibia of the same game. For two-person games, it is known that (i) for a zero-sum game any pairs of its mixed strategy Nash equilibria are interchangeable (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) . establishes that (ii) any unordered pairs of the pure strategy Nash equilibria are interchangeable for a supermodular game, provided that each player's strategy space is totally ordered. As a related result, Vives (1985) also discovers that (iii) the equilibrium set of a strictly supermodular game with totally ordered strategy spaces, is totally ordered.
In what follows, we show that the above results (i), (ii) and (iii) can be derived, in a unified fashion, by our optimization approach. To this end, we shall first introduce order structure.
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Let be a binary relation on a non-empty set S. The pair (S, ) is a partially ordered set if is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
12 A partially ordered set (S, ) is (totally) ordered if for x and y in S either x y or y x is satisfied, and is called chain. A lattice is a partially ordered set (S, ) in which any two elements have a least upper bound (supremum) and a greatest lower bound (infimum) in the set. A real-valued function h defined over a lattice S is called a submodular function if h satisfies the following condition for any x , x ∈ S,
where x ∧ x is an infimum (of x and x ) called meet, and x ∨ x is a supremum called join. Note that (8) trivially holds with equality whenever x and x are ordered, i.e., x x or x x . If ≤ in (8) is replaced with ≥, h is called supermodular. A function h becomes a strictly submodular function if the following inequality holds for any unordered pair x , x ∈ S, i.e., x
x and x x .
A subset S * (⊂ S) is called sublattice if x ∧ x ∈ S * and x ∨ x ∈ S * hold for any x , x ∈ S * .
Throughout this section, we focus on two-person games with finite strategy space for each player. This assumption guarantees the existence of best reply, which is crucial for our characterization. All the results continue to hold for infinite strategy spaces as long as the minimum of f is well-defined.
13 Let E * be the set of Nash equilibria. Unless specified, we consider pure strategy Nash equilibria. If X is a mixed strategy space, then E * should also be extended to mixed strategy equilibria. Before analyzing the structure of E * , we first illustrate the following two properties of minimizers of submodular functions, established by Topkis (1978) .
Fact 1 If h is a submodular function on a lattice S, then the set S * of points at which h attains its minimum on S is a sublattice of S.
Fact 2 If h is strictly submodular on a lattice S, then the set S * of points at which h attains its minimum on S is a chain, i.e., S * is a totally ordered set.
Given our Theorem 2 in Section 3, the above facts immediately imply the following.
14 Lemma 1 Suppose that f is defined by (4) and E * is nonempty. Then,
(ii) If f is strictly submodular on X, then E * is a chain. Now assume that each player's strategy space is totally ordered. Then, the first part of Lemma 1 implies that any unordered pairs of the Nash equilibria must be interchangeable. To see this, suppose that x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ) are two unordered Nash equilibria. Since strategy space for each player is totally ordered but Nash equilibria are unordered, the meet and join must be (x 1 , x 2 ) and (x 1 , x 2 ). The definition of sublattice implies that both strategy 13 A sufficient condition, for example, is that X is a compact set and f is a continuous function in x ∈ X. 14 Assume that a (partial) order on X(= X 1 × X 2 ) is a usual product relation such that, for x, x in X, x x if x i x for i = 1, 2, where i is an order defined over player i's strategy space X i .
profiles must be elements of E * , i.e., they are Nash equilibria. Lemma 1 (i) also guarantees the existence of maximum and minimum Nash equilibria. The second part of the lemma implies that all Nash equilibria are totally ordered, and hence their sizes are comparable to each other (with respect to the order defined over the joint strategy spaces). The next theorem establishes the relationship between f and the players' payoff functions, u i for i = 1, 2. Let us define u as the sum of the payoffs, that is,
Theorem 5 For any two-person game with totally ordered strategy space for each player, (i) f is submodular if and only if u is supermodular.
(ii) f is strictly submodular if and only if u is strictly supermodular.
Proof. Recall that f is a submodular function if, for any x , x ∈ X,
If the above inequality is strict for any unordered pairs, f is a strictly submodular function.
Since we consider two-person games, f (x) can be written as
Now consider a pair of unordered strategy profiles, x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ). 15 Without loss of generality, we assume x 1 1 x 1 and x 2 2 x 2 . Then, the join and the meet become x ∧ x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x ∨ x = (x 1 , x 2 ), respectively. The corresponding values of f are expressed by
Note, in the following calculation, that max parts will be canceled out one another. The left hand side of (10) can therefore be written as
15 Note that f (x ∧ x ) + f (x ∨ x ) − {f (x ) + f (x )} = 0 trivially holds if x and x are ordered.
The above equality illustrates that the submodularity (strict submodularity) of f is completely characterized by the supermodularity (strict supermodularity) of u.
Theorem 5 (i) can be directly applied to a zero-sum game. Since u = u 1 + u 2 always takes 0 for a zero-sum game by its definition, u is trivially (weakly) supermodular with any order of strategies. 16 This implies that, whatever ordering we take on strategy spaces, the supermodularity of u is automatically preserved. Note also that we can incorporate mixed strategies, since u(x) = 0 holds for any mixed (as well as pure) strategy profiles x.
Corollary 2 For any two-person zero-sum game, f is submodular over mixed strategy profiles with any (total) order of strategy space for each player.
Combining this corollary and Lemma 1 (i) in which X is a mixed strategy space and E * is the set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria, we can derive the interchangeability of (mixed strategy) Nash equilibria for zero-sum games.
Theorem 6 For a zero-sum game, any pairs of its Nash equilibria are interchangeable.
Proof. Since the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (or minimax solution) for twoperson zero-sum games is guaranteed by Neumann (1928) and Nash (1950a) , the condition of Lemma 1 (E * is nonempty) is satisfied. Now suppose that x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 ) are two distinct Nash equilibria. Using Corollary 2, let us construct an order that satisfies x 1 1 x 1 and x 2 2 x 2 . By Lemma 1 (i), the set of Nash equilibria is sublattice, which implies that x ∧ x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and x ∨ x = (x 1 , x 2 ) are both Nash equilibria.
Theorem 6 is a well-known result in the early literature in game theory, initially established by Luce and Raiffa (1957) . We provide the same result through an alternative proof that is based on our optimization approach and the lattice structure of Nash equilibria.
Let us now move to a supermodular game and a game with strategic complementarities. In what follows, we focus on a pure strategy space and pure strategy Nash equilibria. A supermodular game is such that u i satisfies the supermodular condition for all i ∈ N . Similarly, a strictly supermodular game is such that u i satisfies the strict supermodular condition for all i ∈ N . A game with strategic complementarities is a weaker notion than supermodular game, which only requires that each player's best reply is (weakly) increasing in other players' strategies. As we discuss later, these games are closely related to each other. Since the sum of supermodular functions preserves supermodularity, we obtain the next lemma.
Lemma 2 The sum of payoff functions, u = u 1 + u 2 , is supermodular for any supermodular games, and u is strictly supermodular for any strictly supermodular games.
That is, the the supermodularity of individual payoff (u i ) implies the supermodularity of total payoff (u), but not vice versa. Lemma 2, combined with Theorem 5, implies the following. 16 Almost identical argument holds for a constant-sum game in which u(x) = k for all x ∈ X for some k.
Corollary 3 For any two-person supermodular games, f is submodular (over pure strategy profiles). For any two-person strictly supermodular games, f is strictly submoduler.
Since the existence of (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for supermodular games is guaranteed by Topkis (1979) , the next theorem is derived from Lemma 1 and Corollary 3. The proof is obvious and thereby skipped.
Theorem 7 Assume that strategy space for each player is totally ordered. Then, (i) For a two-person supermodular game, any unordered pairs of its pure strategy Nash equilibria are interchangeable.
(ii) For a two-person strictly supermodular game, all pure strategy Nash equilibria are totally ordered.
Theorem 7 (i) and (ii) are initially shown by and Vives (1985) , through different and self-contained proofs. To be more precise, their proofs make no explicit use of Fact 1 or 2, properties of (strict) submodular functions discovered by Topkis (1978) . It should also be stressed that the set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game constitutes a complete lattice (Zhou, 1994 ), but need not be a sublattice. 17 In other words, the direct link between supermodular games and the sublattice structure of Nash equilibria has been missed in the literature. We discover this connection, which makes it possible to derive the existing independent results (Theorems 6 and 7) in a unified fashion. Although submodularity and supermodularity depend on cardinal structures of payoff functions, Milgrom and Shannon (1994) extend them and provide ordinal counterparts, quasisubmodularity and quasi-supermodularity, respectively. Namely, h : X → R is called a quasisupermodular function if, for all x and x in X, h(x) ≥ h(x ∧ x ) implies h(x ∨ x ) ≥ h(x ) and h(x) > h(x ∧ x ) implies h(x ∨ x ) > h(x ).
18 They show that a quasi-supermodular game is identical to a game with strategic complementarities. They also establish that Lemma 1 holds if submodularity is replaced with quasi-submodularity. Unfortunately, our Lemma 2 cannot be generalized to quasi-supermodular games since quasi-supermodularity is not preserved in addition. Nevertheless, based on the equivalence between games of strategic complementarities and quasi-supermodular games, we can extend Theorem 7 (i).
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Theorem 8 Assume that strategy space for each player is totally ordered. Then, for a twoperson game with strategic complementarities, any unordered pairs of its pure strategy Nash equilibria are interchangeable.
